The IRS has always been an information intensive enterprise. But it's the organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and intelligence we extract from the information we receive that really matters. It can show us the areas of greatest non-compliance . . . and thereby, contributes to more efficient and effective compliance programs.
-IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman (2011) 1 Every animate and inanimate object on earth will soon be generating data, including our homes, our cars, and, yes, even our bodies.
-THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA (2012) 2 A A A ABSTRACT BSTRACT BSTRACT
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Among government agencies, the IRS likely has the surest legal claim to the most information about the most Americans: their hobbies, religious affiliations, reading activities, travel, and medical information are all potentially tax relevant. Privacy scholars have studied the arrival of Big Data, the internet-of-things, and the cooperation of private companies with the government in surveillance, but neither privacy nor tax scholars have considered how these technological advances should impact the U.S. tax system. As government agencies and private companies increasingly pursue what has been described as the "growing gush of data," the use of these Nickerson v. Comm'r, 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that facts including a taxpayer's reading about farming were evidence that he pursued that activity with a profit-seeking motive). 8 Not only may financial support of religious organizations be tax relevant, but also the distance from a taxpayer's home to any of her religious organizations. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West 2014) (covering charitable contributions and gifts to a church or convention or association of churches); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (2002) (stating that location of religious organization with which taxpayer affiliates is relevant to determining principal residence for gain exclusion). you were considering a carnal quid pro quo when you made a gift to your "mistress." 13 Yet, privacy scholars have taken no note of the IRS's extraordinary legal claim to such information. From the reverse angle, despite the information-intensive aspects of tax law, tax scholars have not taken note of the increasing pervasiveness of information technology. 14 Modern technologies are creating "minutely detailed records" of our existence, 15 increasingly facilitating the "persistent, continuous and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives." 16 One information privacy scholar described the radical and technological transformation of personal information:
The small details that were once captured in dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now preserved forever in the digital minds of computers, vast databases with fertile fields of personal data . . . . Every day, rivulets of information stream into electronic brains to be sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways. Technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are and what we are . . . . It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that covers much of a person's life-a life captured in records, a digital biography composed in the collective computer networks of the world. 17 A prominent national security advisor has predicted that by 2040, all of our daily activities will be known by "governmental "gender identity disorder" disease, but that breast augmentation was merely cosmetic and not a deductible expense). 13 Transfers to a sexual partner may be characterized as either non-taxable gifts or as taxable compensation for sexual activity. See, e.g., United
States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-1135 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the "current law on the tax treatment of payments to mistresses"). 14 Tax scholars have not considered the relevance to tax administration of the Big Data revolution, the rise of the internet-of-things, or other aspects of the information technology revolution. While some scholars have addressed "tax privacy," their primary focus is determining the conditions and corporate entities" pursuing the "growing gush of data" from the "internet of things." 18 As we move towards such a future, the IRS most likely will be among those entities pursuing this growing gush of data. This Article suggests an agenda for discussion among privacy and tax law scholars: issues we ought to consider, research we ought to pursue, and debates we ought to have. In Part I of this Article, I describe the flow of tax-relevant information from taxpayers and third parties to the IRS. I point out two significant problems in that information flow: the compliance burden and the compliance gap. In Part II, I predict that, over the next twenty-five years, surveillance technologies will be used to reduce the compliance burden and gap. I consider the technological and political factors that may pave or block the way for such an increase in surveillance to improve tax administration. In Part III, I recommend a research agenda in an effort to make the integration of surveillance into tax administration more beneficial than harmful. Ultimately, reforming tax law to fit the emerging technology and our privacy expectations will be essential to integrating the information technology revolution into tax administration without disrupting the administration itself.
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In this Part, I describe the information needed to prepare and file an individual's income tax return. The IRS is legally entitled to a great deal of information from a taxpayer. But in practice, very little information is turned over, mostly due to the extremely low audit rate of less than one percent. 19 The tax-return-preparation burden on individuals is quite substantial, amounting to about 7.6 billion work hours a year. 20 And about $450 billion of tax revenue is lost each year due to taxpayers' failure to comply with the tax law. 21 Both of these problems are ameliorated when third parties provide taxrelevant information to both the taxpayers and the IRS. Thus, third-party reporting of information has become essential to the administration of the individual income tax. In Section A, I describe the current system of providing individual income tax information to the IRS. 22 In Section B, I highlight problems 18 Richard Clarke, Richard Clarke on the Future of Privacy: Only the Rich Will Have It, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/rich ard-clarke-on-the-future-of-privacy-only-the-rich-will-have-it-1404762349. 19 See infra note 29. 20 See infra notes 80-81. 21 See infra note 100. 22 I am concerned only with the individual income tax, which is the single largest source of revenue for collection and returns for processing by the that reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and the IRS and that lead to a great loss of tax revenue.
A.
How the IRS Acquires Taxpayer Information
On one hand, the IRS is entitled to any information that may be relevant to determining any tax liability, 23 so it has tremendously broad legal authority to demand information. On the other hand, for a variety of reasons, especially the very low audit rate, relatively little information beyond the numbers on the face of the tax return is ever provided. The following describes the current system of providing individual tax information to the IRS.
Information Provided by the Taxpayer
To understand how information is provided to the IRS, it is important to understand the individual income tax return preparation and filing process. After the close of each year, any individual with gross annual income exceeding a certain amount must file an income tax return. 24 About 145 million individual income tax returns are filed annually. 25 The taxpayer is responsible for learning the relevant law, gathering the relevant factual information, and applying the law to the facts as necessary to determine and report his or her liability for the year. This can be very complicated. For example, a taxpayer who pays for work on the roof of a business warehouse must navigate detailed treasury regulations to determine whether the expense should be deducted or capitalized. 26 The return does not require disclosure of the legal IRS, and, as a tax on individuals, raises the most complex privacy issues.
See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-StatutoryAuthority (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (stating that the IRS collected over $2.5 trillion and processed over 237 million returns in 2012). 23 analysis behind a taxpayer's characterization (e.g., that the expense is deductible), nor does it require the taxpayer to supplement the return with the underlying supporting information (e.g., receipts). 27 For the most part, the return only requires numbers the taxpayer has concluded to be the legally correct ones (e.g., the amount deductible). Once the return is filed, it is subject to an automated review which checks for mathematical errors and compares the information on the return with information the IRS has obtained elsewhere. 28 Less than one percent of individual tax returns are ever audited. 29 In the rare case that a taxpayer is audited, the IRS may demand that the taxpayer provide more information than provided with the return. The taxpayer is obligated to maintain the records necessary to substantiate what he or she determined to be the tax liability, 30 and the IRS is entitled to examine "any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant" to determining any tax liability. 31 As part of its audit, the IRS may penalize the taxpayer for failing to § maintain the adequate records 32 or for failing to have a suitably strong legal argument for the disputed characterization (e.g., the claim that an expense is deductible). 33 If the taxpayer and IRS are unable to resolve their differences during the audit, the dispute may then be litigated in court.
In preparing his or her return, the taxpayer bears the burden of interpreting the law, gathering the factual information, and applying the law to it. The relevance of information is laid out in multiple sources and in varying levels of detail. The Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, administrative rulings and publications, and court cases all determine what information is relevant under a given provision. 34 Determining the individual's taxable income requires all information necessary to determine if a receipt or benefit is includible in or excludible from income, whether or not an expense is deductible from income, and which credits, if any, reduce the tentative tax liability. 35 Some of the information required for determining taxable income is simple, such as the amount of a taxpayer's paycheck. 36 Other 32 See, e.g., id. § 7203 (deeming failure to keep required records to be a misdemeanor). 33 For example, the taxpayer is subject to a penalty for a substantial understatement of income tax, I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (West 2014), except to the extent that the underlying position had substantial authority or was disclosed with the return and had a reasonable basis, id. § 6662(d)(2)(B). 34 For example, I.R.C. § 213 provides specific definitions that must be satisfied for medical expenses to be deductible. The Treasury Regulations require submission of whatever information "the district director may deem necessary" to determine the deductibility of a medical expense. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(f) (1979) (outlining substantiation requirements, including "the nature of any other item of expense and for whom incurred and for what specific purpose, the amount paid therefor and the date of the payment thereof"). The relevant information is then discussed on four of the more than two hundred pages of instructions for the 1040. information required is complex, such as the taxpayer's reason for taking a trip 37 or making a gift. 38 Some information is strictly necessary, such as the purchase price of an asset. 39 Other information is necessary only for administrative safe harbors, such as those for excluding gain on the sale of a residence 40 or characterizing an investment as active rather than passive. 41 Some of the information is relatively public, such as one's address. Other information is intensely private, such as information related to the medical care of oneself or one's family members. 42 While a tremendous amount of information may be relevant and may be subject to review by the IRS in the event of an audit, audits are exceedingly rare. In almost all cases the only information that the taxpayer provides to the IRS is what is provided on the face of the return and as a supplement to it (such as the Form W2 from the taxpayer's employer). More information is only provided if the IRS requests it. Thus, much of the relevant information never flows into the IRS. For example, though the information recording requirements for charitable contributions are fairly detailed, 43 none of those records are submitted with the return. 44 The taxpayer claiming the charitable contribution deduction is obligated to maintain records and provide them to the IRS if requested.
But it is not only the low audit rate that reduces the amount of tax-relevant information actually provided to the IRS for review. In order to lessen the burden on the taxpayer 37 Whether a trip is primarily for business or personal purposes determines the deductibility of travel expenses under I.R.C. § 162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1960) (establishing that whether one undertakes trips for purposes other than business or solely for business purposes affects whether the expenses for said trip are tax deductible). 38 To be excluded from income under I.R.C. § 102 (excluding gifts inter alia), the transferor's motive must be one of detached and disinterested generosity. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 39 I.R.C. § 1012 (West 2014) (defining the cost basis of property). 40 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3 (2004) (outlining safe harbors for reduced maximum exclusions for taxpayers who fail to meet certain requirements). 41 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (1996) (setting the threshold for temporary material participation at more than five hundred hours spent on an activity in a year). 42 57 Id. at 83-84 (characterizing the debate over the obligatory nature of deductions as one of the deepest, most intense, and longest-lasting on the e-mail list-serve of the American Bar Association Section on Taxation). 58 Id. at 89-92. 59 See, e.g., id. at 141 (citing Beatty v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 438 (1980), in which the "taxpayer stated 'that if verification was required of him then he was willing to forego the deduction as the price for preventing the government from interfering in his private affairs.'") 60 These are the miscellaneous itemized deductions, which I.R.C. § 67 provides may not be taken except to the extent that their sum total exceeds two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Examples of miscellaneous itemized deductions include I.R.C. § § 163 (Interest) , 164 (Taxes), 165 (covering casualty and theft losses), 170 (Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts), and 213 (Medical, dental, etc., expenses). 61 I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(B) (West 2014) (reducing the deduction amount for taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $65,000 and eliminating it entirely for adjusted gross incomes above $80,000).
deduction, which requires medical expenses to exceed ten percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 63 This means that the medical records used to substantiate potential deductions will become irrelevant if the total expenses do not exceed the specified amount. Thus, the computational mechanics of certain deductions and credits disqualify many taxpayers who otherwise would qualify, and, as a result, the amount of tax-relevant information for those taxpayers is reduced.
Information Provided by Third Parties
While the taxpayer is obligated to maintain records and provide tax-relevant information to the IRS, either on the initial tax return or later by specific request, 64 the IRS is not limited to obtaining information from the taxpayer. Indeed, information about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers is provided to the IRS in routine reports from third parties. 65 For example, a taxpayer's employer is required to report payroll information to the IRS. 66 A corporation that pays a dividend to the taxpayer must report it to the IRS, 67 as do interest and royalty payors. 68 Whenever a real estate sale closes, the closing agent must report the seller's identity, the property, and the sale price. 69 And any business receiving more than $10,000 (in cash or checks) must report the identity, address, and the Social Security Number of the payor to the IRS. 70 About 63 Id. § 213(a) (explaining that medical expenses not otherwise covered by insurance are deductible to extent the expenses exceed ten percent of adjusted gross income). 64 See supra note 30. 65 seventy-five items are reported by third parties to the IRS whether or not the taxpayer is audited. These items are reported as a matter of routine, not request. 71 But in gathering information about the taxpayer, the IRS is not limited to routine reports. It has broad legal authority to summon information from third parties, including business contacts, employees, and advisors. 72 Even though the attorneyclient privilege and a similar privilege for accountants 73 are available to protect those advisors from being compelled to testify in certain situations, no protection exists if the information has been provided in connection with the preparation of a return. 74 Generally, there is neither Fourth Amendment protection for information held by third parties (including the taxpayer's lawyers or accountants), 75 held by the taxpayer and no one else, Fifth Amendment protection against compulsion is available-but limited. 77 B.
The Tax Information Gap
The current system of providing individual income tax-relevant information to the IRS has two substantial problems. The first is that the burden on individual taxpayers complying with the system is significant. The second is that a great many taxpayers do not comply with the system, causing a tremendous loss of tax revenue. Both of these problems are ameliorated to the extent that third parties provide information to the taxpayer (which tends to ease compliance) and the IRS (which tends to ensure compliance). Both of these problems reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and the IRS.
1.
Compliance Burden
The tax compliance burden is the cost to taxpayers of attempting to report their tax liabilities in a timely manner.
This requires knowing what information is tax relevant, organizing it, and being sufficiently informed as to the tax law and how to make the computations. The IRS estimates that an individual filing the Form 1040, the most commonly filed individual income tax return, will spend sixteen hours doing so. 78 The record keeping requirements are the largest component of that: eight hours. 79 The National Taxpayer Advocate has concluded that individual "taxpayers find the return preparation process so overwhelming that more than 80 77 The Fifth Amendment is not a defense for failing to file an income tax return (e.g., when engaged in an illegal business), though the taxpayer may claim the privilege as to "the specific questions for which a valid privilege exists" so long as the taxpayer completes "the remainder of the form." 3 WHITE COLLAR CRIME Id. percent pay transaction fees to help them file their returns." 80 Tax compliance requires 7.6 billion work-hours a year. 81 If it were an industry, it would employ 3.8 million employees fulltime. 82 The compliance burden is so high because the individual is obligated to navigate a complex, regularly changing set of laws that determines what information is relevant and how it affects the taxpayer's liability. The individual taxpayer's gap of knowledge about the tax law, tax-relevant facts, and how to apply the law to the facts is quite understandable. The tax code has over 3.5 million words, about three times as many as it did in 1975. 83 In hard copy form, the regulations and summaries of administrative guidance and relevant case law take nine feet of shelf space. 84 And the statutory provisions themselves are technical and overlapping. By the National Taxpayer Advocate's count, a taxpayer interested in correctly characterizing college education expenses must navigate eleven different provisions, each of which has its own eligibility requirements, definitions, income thresholds, phase-outs, and inflation adjustments. 85 A similar count of provisions relevant to characterizing retirement savings comes to sixteen different provisions, each with different rules. 86 And both of these categories provide benefits to the taxpayer. "It is not reasonable to expect the average taxpayer to learn the details of at least 27 education and retirement incentives to determine which ones provide the best fit." 87 The burden on the taxpayer is so great that, while sophisticated taxpayers are able to find "loopholes," unsophisticated taxpayers often overpay. 88 To illustrate the last point, the National Taxpayer Advocate pointed out that in 2006, thirty-seven million taxpayers failed to claim a credit for which they were qualified. 89 While the complexity of the tax law imposes a tremendous burden on taxpayers, the law's requirement that third parties provide information to taxpayers significantly reduces that burden. As mentioned above, employers and others are required to report information to both the IRS and the taxpayer, and about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers have 80 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/NationalTaxpayer-Advocate's-2008-Annual-Report-to-Congress. 81 Id. at 3. 82 Id. 83 Id. at 4. 84 Id. 85 Id. at 5. 86 Id. at 6. 87 Id. 88 Id. at 11. 89 Id. information provided to them this way. 90 When third parties are obligated to provide information, they must do so in a particular format. The format requires the third party to know and apply the relevant law so that it provides not only dollar amounts to the taxpayer but characterizes the amount for the taxpayer. The most common example is the Form W-2, the tax statement issued by employers to employees. Box 1 of that form provides not just a dollar amount, but also a characterization of the amount as "wages, tips, [or] other compensation." 91 This puts the burden on the third party to characterize the amount. The Form W-2 instructions to the third party are over thirty pages. 92 To reduce the taxpayer's burden even further, the IRS uses line 7 of the Form 1040 to direct the taxpayer to report the amount from the W-2 box 1. 93 Similarly, box 4 of the W-2 informs the taxpayer how much federal income tax was withheld, 94 while the IRS uses line 62 of the Form 1040 to direct the taxpayer to insert the right amounts. 95 Box 10 of the W-2 characterizes for the taxpayer amounts paid for qualified dependent benefits, which is to be reported by the taxpayer on Form 2441, Part III. Box 12 of the W2 is the characterization for adoption benefits. This is to be reported by the taxpayer on Form 8839, line 20. Other important reports of information to the taxpayer include the Form 1098, which instructs the taxpayer how much qualified mortgage interest he or she paid in the year, 96 an amount that is deductible on line 10 of the Form 1040 Schedule A. 97 The Form 1098-E covers student loan interest reportable on line 33 of the Form 1040. Box 1b of the Form 1099-DIV characterizes payments as qualified dividends, which qualify for a special tax rate and are reported on 9b of the Form 1040. Indeed, there are over seventy-five items of information provided to the taxpayer by third parties that the Form 1040 instructions correlate with a particular line number for the taxpayer. 98 Without the pre-characterization of this information by third parties and the instructional correlation of forms by the IRS, taxpayers using the Form 1040 would spend far more than eight hours maintaining their tax records and eight hours completing the return. 99 This third-party reporting greatly reduces the compliance burden.
The Tax Compliance Gap Is Substantial
The tax compliance gap-the difference between the income tax liability legally owed and the amount timely paidis about $450 billion each year. 100 To put that into context, consider that the Department of Defense budget is about $673 billion. 101 The tax compliance gap is almost four times the size of the Department of the Treasury budget (which includes the IRS). 102 The compliance gap is attributable to non-filing, underreporting, and underpayment. 116 Non-filing is the smallest of the three sources of the gap, responsible for about $28 billion. 117 It occurs when taxpayers who should file a return do not do so on time. 118 Underpayment is the second smallest source of the gap, at $46 billion. 119 This is when taxpayers file the return but do not pay what is due by the due date. 120 Underreporting is the greatest source of the gap-$376 billion). 121 This occurs when taxpayers understate income or overstate exemptions, deductions, or credits. 122 It is clear that third-party reporting to the IRS is directly related to the taxpayers' self-reporting the item. Third-party reported information is "pivotal in causing taxpayers to be forthright in their reporting" to the IRS. 123 When a third party has an obligation to report payments made to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's compliance rate for the item is ninety-six to ninetynine percent. 124 For income items with no third party reporting obligation, the taxpayer compliance rate is less than fifty percent. 125 In other words, when a taxpayer's employer provides Form W2 wage and benefit information both to the taxpayer and the IRS, or when a corporation provides Form 1099-DIV dividend information both to the taxpayer and the IRS, the taxpayer is almost certain to report it. However, when a taxpayer receives a payment that is not reported by a third party such as the receipt of cash for services or purchases, the taxpayer is unlikely to report it. When the IRS does not rely only on the taxpayer's compliance efforts in order to collect information, it collects both more information and more tax revenue. Third party information reporting not only reduces the compliance burden but also the compliance gap. In this Part, I predict that over the next twenty-five years, the IRS will increasingly rely on surveillance technologies to reduce the compliance burden and compliance gap. Both the compliance burden and gap have received attention from the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, the IRS Commissioner, the National Taxpayer Advocate, tax scholars, and politicians. Their call to harness new technologies to solve these problems must now be considered in the context of the information technology revolution. Whether surveillance technologies are used to eliminate the compliance burden and the compliance gap ultimately will be a matter of political will, specifically including the will to reform the tax system to fit the technologies.
The Information Gap Problem
As outlined in Part I, the tax information gap causes two problems: the compliance burden and the compliance gap. The compliance burden is the difficulty taxpayers suffer due to inadequate information about how to comply with and maintain the records for complying with the tax law. The compliance gap is how much federal tax revenue is lost through noncompliance. The tax compliance burden amounts to 7.6 billion hours a year of taxpayer time, 126 and the tax compliance gap costs the federal revenue $450 billion a year. 127 Both the compliance burden and compliance gap have received considerable political attention. As Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in 2015, Senator Orin Hatch described the costs of compliance as equal to the economy of New Zealand. 128 Senator Ron Wyden described the compliance process as "painful." 129 In 2011, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on the tax gap, during which Senator Hatch testified that the "[t]ax gap is the great white whale of deficit reduction. If only the government was able to collect what it is owed, our deficits would be reduced significantly." 130 Senator Max Baucus identified increased information reporting as one of the most promising solutions to closing the tax gap, but worried that increasing information reporting would inappropriately increase the burden on the informationreporting third parties. 131 He hoped there would be "ways the IRS can harness new technology." 132 IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman articulated a specific vision of how new technology could harness more information and improve tax administration. Commissioner Schulman described the IRS as "an information intensive enterprise," saying that what "really matters" to the IRS is "the organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and intelligence we extract from the information." 133 In this context, he articulated his "long-term vision" that "the IRS could get all information from third parties before individual taxpayers filed their returns. Taxpayers or their return preparers could then access that information, via the Web, to prepare their tax returns." 134 Echoing the Commissioner and tax scholars, 135 the National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olsen has called for third parties to electronically report information to taxpayers to aid them in preparing their returns. 136 However, she went one step further in her recommendations by suggesting that the IRS use third-party reported information to prepare returns for taxpayers. 137 On this point, she echoed President Barak Obama's campaign call to provide "taxpayers the option of prefilled tax forms to verify, sign and return. B.
Information Technology Revolution and the Information Gap
These proposals for using technology to leverage tax information for taxpayers have to be considered in light of the revolution in information technology. If the IRS could collect and analyze all tax-relevant information, it could lower both the compliance gap and compliance burden. Presumably the coming ubiquity of smart devices and the ability to process the massive quantities of data generated by those devices 139 could enable the IRS to do so. How might the "minutely detailed records of our lives" created by these technologies be used in tax compliance? 140 Imagine that every day "rivulets of information stream into electronic brains" at the IRS "to be sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways" to determine tax consequences. 141 While the use of this information for tax compliance purposes might be novel, those rivulets of information already exist and are expanding. These streams of information already flow from and through government agencies and private companies. Government agencies, "industry, employers, hospitals, transportation providers, Silicon Valley, and individuals" are all "linked, shared, and integrated." 142 They use the "same technologies and techniques" to gather information so that the "digital fruits" can be shared between them. 143 And over the next twenty years, those shared rivulets of information will swell with the "growing gush of data" from the "internet of things." 144 Other government agencies, such as the NSA have taken the lead in pursuing this growing gush of data, but the IRS may follow their lead. Reportedly, the NSA's goal is intercepting, sorting, and analyzing much of the world's internet activities. 145 The quantity of information processed by the NSA is tremendous-it is estimated that every fourteen seconds, the NSA processes information equal to all of the information in the Library of Congress. 146 public-private partnership designed to provide "contemporary and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and everything we do, say, or write." 147 Over the next twenty-five years, as we move towards 2040, the year by which these details may be known to the agencies and companies, presumably the IRS will be among those entities pursuing this growing gush of data. This prospect gives privacy law and tax law scholars a good deal to discuss. 148 C.
Predicting a Tax Surveillance System I predict that over the next twenty-five years surveillance technologies will be used to reduce the compliance burden and compliance gap, at least to some extent. The growing gush of data is too valuable to ignore when contemplating how to solve the compliance burden and gap. But technological and political factors will either pave or block the way for increasing surveillance to improve tax administration. Ultimately, it is the political factors that will determine the extent to which the IRS is enabled to capture the growing "rivulets of information" streaming "into electronic brains." 149 1.
The IRS and the Growing Gush of Data
Consider how the IRS might use the growing gush of data. In a world where government agencies and private companies achieve "perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and everything we do, say, or write," 150 we can imagine those details flowing through electronic brains at the IRS for tax analysis. With information about a taxpayer's location each day and night, travel, and purchase patterns and those of her family members, colleagues, and customers, the IRS might determine the likelihood that a particular residence is the taxpayer's principal residence, 151 that she regularly conducts business activities within it, 152 that some of those with whom 147 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 4, at 64. 148 Clarke, supra note 18. 149 Solove, supra note 17, at 1394. 150 Id. she shares the residence are dependents 153 or that one is a former spouse from whom she is legally separated, 154 or that certain meal expenses 155 are for business rather than personal purposes. 156 By comparing a taxpayer's business expenses with those of taxpayers in the same line of business, the IRS might determine the likelihood that an expense was "ordinary" and "necessary", and therefore, deductible. 157 By analyzing what a taxpayer reads (where and for how long a taxpayer's gaze falls on certain screens), 158 the entertainment a taxpayer pursues, and where and how much time a taxpayer spends in relevant places, the IRS might determine the likelihood that certain expenses (e.g., for raising horses) were non-deductible hobby expenses rather than deductible business expenses. 159 Over the next twenty-five years, it is likely that there will be efforts to meet the need for more tax-relevant information with technologies that can gather it efficiently and analyze it reliably. The result could be technologically pre-filled returns ready for the taxpayer to verify, sign and submit. While there are about 145 million individual tax returns filed each year, potentially tax-relevant information would need to be gathered on anyone who may have income in order to determine if the income meets the threshold for filing. As the tax system has increasingly become used for purposes other than revenuecollection-such as delivering welfare payments through the Earned Income Tax Credit or health care coverage though the Affordable Care Act 160 -information on many individuals who have no income would need to be gathered as well. This routine, systematic collection of data on such a large population-this surveillance 161 of the population-could eliminate all compliance burdens on individuals, as well all routes of evasion. 159 The line between deductible business expenses and non-deductible personal expenses is particularly difficult to discern when the taxpayer has a hobby that generates income, even though the taxpayer is pursuing the hobby for pleasure rather than profit. See Treas. First, it is focused on learning information about individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary. Third, surveillance is routine-a part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that characterizes modern societies. Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes-rarely totalitarian domination, but more typically subtler forms of influence or control.
Technological Feasibility
This prediction naturally requires an inquiry into what the relevant surveillance technology would require and whether such a "Tax Surveillance System" could become technologically feasible over the next twenty-five years. It seems most likely that "barring some civilization-threatening disaster, the next 25 years of cyberspace will see a growing gush of data" that will be collected and analyzed by "an increasingly rapid spreading of interconnected devices into every aspect of our lives, in our cars, throughout our homes, and, indeed, into our bodies." 162 This internet-of-things is predicted to include fifty billion objects by 2020. 163 By 2040 it "could be a given" that all of our activities are known by governmental and corporate entities." 164 Of course, accurately predicting the specifics of future technological developments is notoriously difficult. 165 Only time will tell. But in the meantime private companies are betting that "Big Data" and the internet-of-things and other technological advancements will be transformative.
Yet, while these may be tremendously useful for companies seeking profit, it may be that the tax system's need for these advancements would be significantly different. It may turn out that much of what private companies are best at doing would not easily transfer to tax surveillance. Private companies aim to monitor, predict, and change consumer behavior. Their analysis does not require legal-standard accuracy. For example, a retailer's attempt to determine who is especially vulnerable to specific marketing efforts may only be accurate two-thirds of the time, yet be exceptionally profitable and impose no harm on the remaining one-third of subjects targeted. However, the Tax 163 Clark, supra note 18. 164 Id. drag (over-taxing) or windfall (under-taxing), and even increase tax administration and compliance costs. The profit-driven data techniques that private companies develop over the next twenty-five years likely will be of some use in designing the tax system, but quite different techniques also would have to be developed to make tax surveillance feasible. The primary problem the Tax Surveillance System would face is developing a system sufficiently intelligent to identify tax-relevant information and issues and to find, interpret, and apply the appropriate law. The system would not only need to surveil a taxpayer's purchases, but also to determine the likelihood that the purchase was related to the taxpayer's business and, if so, whether it should deducted or capitalized. 166 Even these basic issues can challenge an experienced tax professional; automating a process to do this work may be impossible. Any undertaking to "automate" legal decision-making is tremendously complex and requires multiple types of expertise. When automating legal decisionmaking, programmers must make decisions in order to interpret the law and then translate it into computer code, and they almost always lack the legal and policy expertise to do this. 167 Even if a programmer has the requisite expertise, computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the law. 168 The combination of this limited expertise and limited vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when decision-making has been automated in other areas. 169 And coding tax law would be especially complex. The complexity of tax law is notorious. 170 For example, some provisions require not only interpreting text, but also interpreting Congressional assumptions and purposes. 171 In the tax context, basic issues are sometimes exceptionally complicated; in the coding world, even basic factual issues, like correctly identifying individuals, 166 have posed significant problems for automation projections. 172 Consider how complicated identifying the taxpayer becomes in the partnership context. Although a partnership has a taxpayer identification number, earns income, and pays expenses, those items of income and deductions are allocated to the partners to be reported under their own taxpayer identification numbers. 173 These allocations may not follow the same formula for each item, and, as a further complication, the formulae may not be set at the time the underlying transaction occurs. 174 But tax law is not only complex-it is uncertain. The length and detail of the Code notwithstanding, there is limited and conflicting authority on many points of law. How would the Tax Surveillance System be designed to manage such legal complexity and uncertainty? It may be that, absent substantial tax reform as discussed in Section III, it simply could not be done.
Another technological problem that would impede development of a Tax Surveillance System is the security of the system. First, the system would need to be secured from inappropriate manipulation by the taxpayer. Second, the information would need to be secured from inappropriate access by IRS and other government employees. History has shown such inappropriate access to be a recurring problem. 175 Third, the information-and its revelation of maps of activities and webs of relationships-would need to be secured from hackers with various motivations: those interested in identity theft; those interested in espionage; and those interested in detecting vulnerabilities in order to extract payment. 176 172 For example, identification problems in the automated no-fly lists are notorious-and difficult to correct. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75. 173 Technologically securing the system would be no small design feat and would be essential to such a system's feasibility. 177 A workable Tax Surveillance System would not drop into place fully formed. Implementing such a massive program would have to be piecemeal. The sequencing of program pieces would be important not only for technical purposes, 178 but also for educating taxpayers and training government employees. Acknowledging that the practicalities would require such a system to arrive gradually makes its arrival more plausible. Consider the incremental steps such a system might take.
The first step might be merely greatly expanding thirdparty reporting requirements. As discussed above, these are essential to tax administration, 179 are widespread, and are increasing. 180 Both the IRS Commissioner and the National Taxpayer Advocate have envisioned widespread electronic reporting of information by third parties to the IRS as a means to reduce the compliance burden and the compliance gap. This information would be reported to a site, which would then provide the information to taxpayers.
A second step might be the integration of private return preparation services into the project on a voluntary basis. A very pale version of this already exists insofar as some taxpayers use return preparation software that downloads information from third parties. 181 These companies might next develop ways to reduce their taxpayer-customer's recordkeeping requirements throughout the year by monitoring their location and travels, online activities, and electronic payment transactions, electronically recording relevant information to 177 The current system has become an appealing target-and is a vulnerable one. Jada F. Smith, Cyberattack Exposes I.R.S. Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 05/27/business/breach-exposes-irs-tax-returns.html?ref=business&_r=0. 178 In Colorado, the failure to test run the automated benefits system led to disastrous consequences. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75. address issues not covered by the payor-payee relationship usually found in third-party reporting situations. Both expanding third-party reporting requirements and integrating private return preparation services might cover a great many individuals, including those whose tax-relevant information is mostly already subject to third-party reporting obligations, those who claim only the standard deductions, and those who use tax return preparation software that electronically files the return with the IRS. With facilitation by the IRS, third-party information reporters and returnpreparation software designers could cooperate and achieve a significant reduction in these taxpayers' compliance burden. But these taxpayers-the ones with a high level of information being reported by third parties and claiming only the standard deduction-already have a low compliance burden. And they already have a high compliance rate.
Ultimately, it is the taxpayers with low levels of thirdparty-reported information and low levels of compliance that must be included if the Tax Surveillance System is to serve its purposes. It is this project that would require extraordinary technological developments, not only with respect to gathering the information but, more so, with respect to the artificial legal intelligence necessary to use the information. As a practical matter, discussed in the next Section, this would require substantive tax reform in order to fit the law's information requirements into what can be best gathered and processed with the new technology.
Political Feasibility
Ultimately, the arrival of a Tax Surveillance System would not be so much a matter of technological capability as it would be of political will. Political forces could modify the law to fit within the technological capabilities that emerge over the next twenty-five years. Yet, like technological feasibility, only time will tell whether such a system could become politically feasible.
Senator Orrin Hatch identified the most politically sensitive issue when addressing the Senate Finance Committee. He pointed out that the "government could close the tax gap entirely by putting IRS agents in every family's living room and in every small business," but, he said, "this is a price that a liberty loving people, and their representatives, are rightly unwilling to pay." 182 Politically, how would the benefits of lowering the compliance burden and closing the compliance gap be balanced with concerns over the electronic equivalent of IRS agents in every family's living room?
It is not clear how the anti-tax political forces would react to such a proposal. Closing the tax gap, as Senator Hatch said, is the "great white whale" of deficit reduction. Collecting all of what is owed rather than only a fraction of it obviously would allow rates to be lowered without lowering the revenue collected. The anti-tax political forces articulate their concerns in both economic terms 183 and philosophical objections. 184 Those motivated by economic concerns generally oppose the current income tax base or current rates. They are convinced that the structure of one, the other, or both undermines economic growth. Those whose anti-tax sentiment is more ideological, on the other hand, are committed to reducing the federal government. And that commitment presumably would be threatened at least as much, if not more, by federal surveillance programs as by federal taxing and spending.
Ultimately, the Tax Surveillance System debate would become a matter for popular support or resistance. Would voters be more motivated by the appeal of a lower deficit, easier compliance, and significant tax reform, or by fear of widespread surveillance? The strong libertarian impulse among some Americans 185 would be at odds with moving towards a Tax Surveillance System, regardless of the appeal to change details of the tax system. Indeed, the words "Tax Surveillance System" may conjure nightmares. 186 But popular opposition may be broader than political libertarianism. Many might be opposed to the "surveillant symbiosis" between government and big companies that may lead to the rise of the "surveillanceindustrial complex. While anti-surveillance sentiment may be strong and could eventually triumph, as a practical matter, most Americans are not very motivated to resist being monitored. 188 It may be that within the next twenty-five years, surveillance for tax compliance purposes will come to be seen as no big deal. The Tax Surveillance System agenda seems most likely to be settled by events, not debates. If Americans continue to be habituated to surrender privacy for services, and if doing so continues to seem risk-free, 189 then the burden-free compliance service offered through tax surveillance likely will be seen as acceptable. If, however, Americans begin to experience more harms from surrendering their privacy, resistance to increased surveillance seems more likely. Widespread actual harms may convince Americans to protect their personal information. These harms may come in a number of forms: credit and cash access problems caused by data breaches; automated mistakes with irreparable consequences; weariness with the psychic weight of ongoing surveillance; shifts in power between the police and the policed; incidents of stalkers, kidnappers, and murderers taking advantage of electronically accessible personal information. Or, it may be a handful of incidences of terrorists or enemy states doing so. 190 Unless the incidents and awareness of actual privacy harm become widespread, the impulse to exchange personal information for personal convenience likely will continue to grow unchecked. And if this continues, it seems likely that within twenty-five years, the tradeoff between surveillance and lower deficit, tax reform, and burden-free compliance will favor surveillance. In Part I, I described the current system for reporting taxpayer information to the IRS and the information-related compliance burden and gap problems. In Part II, I predicted that, over the next twenty-five years the IRS will be among the agencies and private companies trying to capture the growing gush of data. In this Part, I recommend several lines of research, discussion, and debate about the IRS's pursuit of the data gush. The recommendations relate to protecting taxpayer privacy and autonomy, determining the extent of legal authority and constitutional limits and the need to coordinate various statues, and the substantive reform that would be necessary to create tax law that would be well served by a Tax Surveillance System.
Privacy and Autonomy
The prospect of a Tax Surveillance System raises significant concerns about the privacy of taxpayers. A great deal of the research agenda concerning how the information technology revolution should affect tax administration must focus on protecting the privacy of the taxpayers, even while gathering and analyzing all of their tax-relevant information. Some part of the solution to these problems would be reducing and refining what is considered tax relevant. But even within the settled-upon scope of information that is necessary to collect, the agenda should determine how best to design a surveillance system that values taxpayer privacy.
Privacy is most commonly understood by scholars to be an individual's interest in how his or her personal information is collected, processed, and used. 191 If privacy is the interest in regulating the flow of personal information, the information revolution's shrinking of how much information can be kept secret does not mean that "the age of privacy is over." 192 Rather, it means it is the beginning of an age in which privacy is more important than ever. The more personal information is collected, processed, and used, the more important an individual's interest in managing how this happens. Regarding privacy merely as the ability of an individual to keep information secret obscures rather than reveals what is most pressing about privacy and the information technology revolution.
Of course, the interest in controlling personal information was not generated by a technological revolution. Controlling personal information has always helped us regulate our social relationships and exercise our individual autonomy. Through controlling what we reveal to others, we control the degree of intimacy. 193 Our most intimate relationships tend to be those in which we have shared a "slow process of mutual revelation." 194 In social settings, privacy is our claim on controlling information about ourselves. It is valued in that it guides the development of our personal relationships. 195 Privacy is also valued because it provides "breathing room" for the development of our own personhood. 196 It is within this breathing room-this zone of privacy-that we are able to "develop and exercise" meaningful autonomy. 197 Without privacy, we self-censor, suffer embarrassment, become inhibited, and experience "powerlessness, vulnerability, and dehumanization." 198 But privacy is not an individualistic value. Protecting autonomous zones in which individuals can flourish with limited intrusiveness benefits society. 199 Protecting an individual's autonomy redounds to the benefit of a free society through the flourishing of expression, innovation, experimentation, reflective citizenship, and a vital culture. 200 Without privacy protection, individual activities that contribute to the greater public good are impeded. 201 A free society "ignores privacy at its peril." 202 A substantial part of the research agenda related to taxation and surveillance should be dedicated to determining how to gather and analyze tax-relevant information without losing the public good of privacy. How should a system be designed to harvest the right information while respecting privacy zones in which taxpayers have breathing room and are not dehumanized or made powerless? How can taxpayers be sufficiently surveilled to gather the right information without sacrificing innovation, citizenship, and culture? These are not so much questions for legal experts as for psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers.
One of the difficulties of addressing these questions is that the cultural norms as to privacy zones are being transformed by the information technology revolution. It may be that what would be necessary to comfort taxpayers in 2015 is radically different from what will be necessary in 2040. With that in mind, perhaps research will reveal that implementing the system through steps appropriate for the relevant time is the best way forward, presuming that what is appropriate will change with time. Perhaps, as suggested above, the first steps might be taken with respect to the information already reported by third parties, as taxpayers are already conditioned to have little control over this information. Perhaps the next step might be a voluntary program providing a reduced compliance burden in exchange for a greater degree of surveillance. By making the sacrifice of privacy a matter of taxpayer choice, a taxpayer's interest in controlling personal information could be respected. Then, maybe, the next step would be to allow taxpayers to choose between two tax systems, one in which less information is collected but certain benefits are not available, and one in which more information is collected and more benefits are available. For example, in the simplified system, there might be fewer potential benefits for higher education expenses but no need to monitor, for example, the taxpayer's degree progress. 203 Or perhaps the taxpayer should be empowered to opt out of surveillance at certain times or in certain situations, with the provision that there would be no tax benefits available for expenses. For example, a taxpayer might be able to opt out of surveillance of travel with the consequence that none of the travel expenses would be deductible, even if they otherwise would have been. By putting the taxpayer in the control of the surveillance, the taxpayer would control his or her personal information and be able to define his or her privacy zones. The design problem would be to balance these options for the taxpayer with the tax system's interest in collecting all of the relevant information.
At some point, empirical research into exactly what concerns taxpayers and how those concerns might be addressed would be needed. For example, if research determines that taxpayers are most concerned about their personal information being misconstrued, then procedures to ensure accurate analysis might address the concern. If research reveals a great concern that the information not be misused, leaked, or hacked, then measures to reduce the chances of misuse or inappropriate dissemination would be the appropriate solution. Research might determine that there is concern that information would be used by agencies other than the IRS, in which case the legal restrictions on the secondary use of information by other agencies may need to be strengthened. 204 Such use is already limited, but so is the scope of the information to which the IRS has access. It may be that social research reveals that what matters to taxpayers is not so much the control of all personal information, but rather the control of certain types of information. Presumably, taxpayers care less about controlling the information about their paychecks, since their employers already know the amount, than they do in controlling information about their health, even though their doctors are also privy to that knowledge. Protecting taxpayers' privacy means designing a system that values whatever it is that taxpayers value when assessing the flow of their personal information. It would mean designing a system in which taxpayers feel neither dehumanized nor powerless.
It would be important to surveil taxpayers without making them less expressive and innovative. The risk of surveillance is that it reduces creativity, expression, and innovation. 205 Over the next twenty-five years, these negative consequences may diminish as cultural norms develop to reflect the new information technology. Of course, since surveillance for any number of purposes will increase, concern for creativity, expression, and innovation is not tax-specific. Yet, to the extent that the tax system would be focused on surveilling economically significant activities, policy makers should think about how to limit economic chilling effects. If a business owner is unduly sensitive to the tax surveillance system, such that she spends less on a business development dinner than she otherwise would, then the restaurant and waitstaff would earn less than they would earn in a world without tax surveillance. More pervasively and more perniciously, if business owners take fewer risks, incline their business decisions towards safety, and temper their entrepreneurial aspirations, the economy as a whole might suffer. Surveilling economic activity could have the consequence of chilling innovative economic activity. 206 How would the Tax Surveillance System affect the taxpayer's sense of citizenship? The pervasiveness of the surveillance system could potentially make Americans more aware of federal tax needs, laws, and politics. Indeed, the system could be structured so that taxpayers are able to provide ongoing feedback-communicating to the IRS as taxpayers and to their elected representatives as voters. Perhaps such a system would facilitate the broadening and deepening of civic involvement of taxpayers, and improve democratic participation. Or, it might have the opposite effect. The movement towards the IRS pre-preparing income tax returns has been criticized on grounds relevant to tax surveillance: by making tax compliance less burdensome, taxpayers may lose an important connection to the tax system. For some commentators, the concern is that taxpayers would be less politically inclined to resist tax increases. 207 For other commentators, the concern is a more general one about citizens and their awareness of the laws and fulfillment of their duties. 208 Becoming an object of ongoing government surveillance no doubt affects how a citizen relates to his or her democratic government, and how that relationship is likely to be affected should be a seriously considered.
The effect of the Tax Surveillance System on a taxpayer's sense of citizenship would be complicated because the surveillance system would not present itself as a "government" system. In fact, there is no system of "government" surveillance. Surveillance is a "linked, shared, and integrated" project of both government agencies and private companies. 209 A Tax Surveillance System would not be a system independent of all others. It would be the integration of tax administration systems into the existing, integrated surveillance infrastructure.
Currently, even if a citizen's online life mediated through companies such as Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, Amazon, and Youtube is monitored by government agencies, for most citizens, awareness of the monitoring is at a low level or, at least, a low concern. However, if the monitoring twentieth century, one effect was increased investment in the tax-exempt securities market. The publicity thus decreased the revenue collectible from the income tax. This impact on economic behavior was one of the reasons the Treasury Department opposed publicizing individual income were used to determine tax liabilities, the awareness and concern would be quite different. Receiving a tax return each year reflecting surveilled activities would no doubt increase a taxpayer's self-awareness and would probably affect his or her behavior. Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, Amazon, Youtube and innumerable other companies would mediate the taxpayer's relationship to government. Integrating tax administration into the joint surveillance system would mean integrating one's sense of being a citizen and a consumer, and the likely consequences of fusing these and related roles should be a topic of considerable discussion.
The cooperation between government and private companies in surveilling citizens also raises issues of personal autonomy. Private sector designs increasingly focus on the virtual space in which consumers interact with the company's data collection system in order to gather more information about the consumer than the consumer is aware he or she is providing. They do this in order to exploit the consumer's personal vulnerabilities for company profit. 210 Even if the information gathered by such methods were within the legal authority of the IRS, such collection methods raise tremendously important issues about citizenship and governance in a free society. It may be quite effective to exploit a taxpayer's vulnerabilities in order to extract the most useful tax-relevant information. And it may even be legal. But there should be considerable debate about the appropriateness in a free society of the government exploiting taxpayers' vulnerabilities to gather tax-relevant information well beyond what the individual likely believes he or she is disclosing.
Yet, what may look like exploiting a taxpayer's vulnerabilities from one perspective may look like merely personalizing a system in a helpful way from another perspective. It may be that the system could be designed in a personalized way to increase a taxpayer's own rationality with respect to tax savings. Perhaps one taxpayer would be best motivated by retirement account contributions, with a spreadsheet of information; another by feedback delivered through a digitized human face; 211 and another by a few lines of a favorite song while filling out a form. The techniques that may discern a taxpayer's vulnerabilities for manipulation might be used to steer the taxpayer towards a lower tax liability. But it is not merely whether the technology would be 210 used to increase or decrease a taxpayer's liability that should be of concern, but also whether the taxpayer would appreciate the way in which he or she was being monitored and manipulated by a government agency. The concern over how surveillance would affect individual taxpayers should also consider the technological intrusiveness of the system into the taxpayer's life. Technological intrusiveness saps a person's time, attention, and energy by interrupting his or her activities and sense of solitude. 212 There are great variations among individuals with respect to sensitivities to technological intrusiveness. Relative to a college student, a retired executive might have a greater potential for ever-increasing tax rationality. Yet, the college student might have a higher threshold for technological intrusiveness. An Amish business owner 213 might have considerable interest in seeking out tax savings, but, given the sect's resistance to technologies widely used by other Americans, he or she 214 presumably would resist technological intrusions. Not only are there individual variations in sensitivities across individuals, but the same individual's sensitivities may vary over short periods. For example, a Sabbath observer would resist any involvement or intrusiveness once a week, no matter his or her preferences on the other six days. The Tax Surveillance System should be designed to respect the autonomy of individuals as members of a free and diverse society. Yet it would also need to be effective. The Sabbath observing taxpayer should be given a day of rest from technological intrusiveness. But the design to accommodate this weekly rest should not provide a weekly opening for tax evasion.
B. Legal Authority and Limits
A Tax Surveillance System legal research agenda should address how best to reform the substantive tax law to fit privacy concerns and technological capabilities and should seek to determine the limits of the IRS's information-gathering authority. The latter raises many of the same issues that any widespread government surveillance operation would, but should be framed within the broad authority of the IRS to require and inspect records maintained by the taxpayer and to compel third parties to provide information to the IRS. 212 See Solove, supra note 201, at 553-555. One issue to be resolved is whether the current grant of the right to require and inspect records would be sufficient to allow the IRS to require participation in a surveillance system that automatically generated records for IRS inspection. Of course, it is Congress rather than the IRS that would devise a Tax Surveillance System, modifying whatever laws would be necessary to authorize its implementation. Nevertheless, such widespread information gathering may already be within the scope of authority granted to the IRS, given that it is so broad. 215 Another line of research should inquire into how much information the IRS might be able to obtain from third parties such as Facebook. The IRS has the authority to summon information from knowledgeable third parties. 216 In practice, the information is provided by third parties merely after an informal request by the IRS. 217 While Facebook has not publicized how many requests for information it has received from the IRS, it has publicized that it produced information in response to over 35,000 requests from U.S. government agencies in the past year. 218 If a third party refuses to comply with the informal request, the IRS can formally summons the party and seek to compel production of the information in federal court. 219 Under current law, the burden on the IRS is not high. It need only act in good faith and issue the summons for a legitimate purpose. 220 There is no need for the IRS to meet any standard of probable cause, but rather only to show that "inquiry may be relevant" and that the IRS does not already have the information. . 221 The court in Powell stated:
[T]he Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his summons. . . . He must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed. It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the Would taxpayers have any Fifth Amendment argument against participating in the Tax Surveillance System? The Fifth Amendment provides limited protection in the tax system. It is not a defense for failing to file an income tax return, even when, for example, the taxpayer is engaged in an illegal business. However, the taxpayer may claim the privilege as to "the specific questions for which a valid privilege exists," so long as the taxpayer completes "the remainder of the form." 222 Tax-relevant records that have been voluntarily prepared by the taxpayer have not been compelled and thus do not qualify for Fifth Amendment protection. 223 However, the acts of "gathering, identifying, and authenticating" the tax relevant records may be testimonial and, therefore, privileged. 224 How should this apply when tax records are automatically generated by and reported to the IRS?
The broad scope of the IRS's authority to gather information and its constitutional limitations have not been considered in light of the technological capacity to gather all that is allowed. The issues raised by "broad, indiscriminate, and continuous" surveillance 225 are far-reaching and deep. In fact, they are not unique to surveillance for tax purposes. Legal scholars have already discussed similar issues in national security and criminal investigations. 226 But the Supreme Court has only begun to consider how the information-technology revolution affects constitutional rights. In light of United States v. Jones, a case in which the Court considered law enforcement's use of a GPS-tracking device on a suspect's car, there is reason to anticipate that, in future cases, several Justices will focus on the quantities of information gathered. 227 If the Supreme Court becomes interested in this "quantitative privacy," 228 any widespread government surveillance system would be implicated, including tax surveillance. Another constitutional issue raised by this type of surveillance concerns the exercise of fundamental rights. We know that surveillance chills behavior. Surveillance for tax purposes could chill constitutionally protected behavior. For example, when a woman exercises her constitutional right to an abortion, the abortion's potential as a deductible medical expense means that various details-such as the gestational age of the fetus-would be tax-relevant information. 229 Knowing the IRS was collecting this information might chill her choice. Currently, the IRS is entitled to such information, but it is unlikely that it would actually be collected or used for two reasons. First, it is very unlikely many women know of the potential tax relevance of the information. If a woman does not know it is subject to IRS review, it cannot chill her choice. Second, none of the information would ever be requested by the IRS unless the deduction were taken (less than seven percent of returns), 230 the return audited (less than one percent), 231 and, even then, only if the particular deduction were questioned. However, under a Tax Surveillance System, the monitoring of medical expenses would be routine. Would the potential chilling of fundamental rights mean that the surveillance system would have to be limited in substantial ways?
Of course, the Constitution is not the only body of law guiding development of a Tax Surveillance System. We ought to think about how the system would interact with existing statutes outside of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, especially as to the information flow gathered from or through third parties, the System's design may need to be coordinated with various statutory schemes: the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 232 237 Finally, research ought to be conducted on how other government agencies might seek to use the information collected through the Tax Surveillance System, and how this ought to be regulated. Under current law, government agencies are able to access information held by the IRS in certain situations. 238 Should greatly increasing the information held by the IRS increase or decrease that access? Anticipating that there would be an increased information flow from the IRS to other agencies highlights the risk that the removal of information from the tax context increases the chances that this information will later be misunderstood. 239 Even when the context is superficially relevant to tax administration, such as in economics or accounting, the tax-law meaning of a word like "income" is quite different than its meaning elsewhere. 240 Words in the tax code often have technical meanings that are different than the casual interpretations. For instance, one's "principal residence" may not be one's home, 241 and one's child may not be one's "dependent." 242 Characterization in tax law can also be at odds with other legal characterizations. For example, a limited liability company duly organized, operated, and recognized for all state law purposes may be non-existent for tax purposes, with its employees, income, and expenses appearing as its sole member's own. 243 Thus, the agenda should include not only debating the terms on which other agencies should be able to access the tax information, but also discussing how those agencies could accurately translate information from the tax context into their own. C.
Tax Surveillance and Tax Reform
A final set of research questions relate to reforming the tax law itself. The tax system we have is not designed for the information collecting and processing technologies now 236 These new technologies hold potential for solving the compliance burden and gap problems. They also hold potential for undermining privacy and the goods it protects and promotes. But the administration of an income tax system inevitably requires disclosure of information we otherwise keep private. After all, we do not disclose our paycheck amounts to others, at least not widely or frequently. Indeed, discussions of money matters-even between spouses-tend to be taboo. 245 Yet, the income tax system depends on access to private information, and not only about one's paycheck or business, but about one's home, family, and health. Unavoidability justifies some privacy burden on taxpayers, but not any burden. Under the current system, only a minuscule amount of information to which the IRS is entitled is actually collected. This does not reflect a privacy policy, but rather other factors, especially the very low audit rate. While Congress has made all sorts of information tax relevant, and while the IRS has the legal authority to demand any tax-relevant information, the practical constraints on gathering and processing information have meant that people have had to give relatively little thought to the scope of tax-relevant information. But in a system in which all of the information that is relevant is gathered and processed, there should be considerably more concern to carefully define what is relevant. The upside of the Tax Surveillance System would be reducing the compliance gap and compliance burden by gathering and processing all of the relevant information; the downside would include the harms to taxpayer privacy, which currently is protected only by practical inabilities.
A fundamental project in integrating tax policy and privacy policy should be assessing the current tax law in light of privacy concerns. We need to devise some way to measure the privacy burdens of the current tax law. Perhaps this begins with measuring the information collection that is already accepted without protest. This is primarily the third-party reported information already collected on almost all taxpayers, 244 Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 157, 175 (1990) . 245 See, e.g., Joan Atwood, Couples and Money: The Last Taboo, 40 AM. J.
FAMILY THERAPY 1 (2012).
such as paycheck and dividend amounts. 246 Reporting this information does not appear to undermine social good, perhaps because it involves dollar amounts paid to third parties or received from third parties without a cultural expectation of secrecy. This information is collected on most taxpayers, and it is collected routinely.
The information routinely and universally collected should be compared to information that is collectible only in an audit. In an audit situation, the IRS has broad legal authority. As noted, the agency is entitled to any information that may be relevant to determining a tax liability. 247 And it is during an audit that the most sensitive information is at risk. For example, an audit of dependent status might require the taxpayer to disclose how many nights of the year the child slept in the taxpayer's house and how many elsewhere, 248 the citizenship of the child, 249 and whether or not the child has any disabilities. 250 If the audit covers adoption expenses, it might include information about the child's special needs, 251 surrogate parenting arrangements, 252 and the legal relationship of the child to the taxpayer's spouse. 253 Under a Tax Surveillance System, all of this information, though rarely gathered now, would always be gathered on all taxpayers to determine if the taxpayer had qualifying dependents and how related expenses should be characterized.
In thinking about this issue, we must not only examine the privacy burdens if all of the information relevant under current law were collected, but must also determine some way to balance the potential privacy harms against the benefits to the taxpayer and the tax system. While it is invasive to investigate the disabilities, special needs, or surrogate parenting arrangements of a child, the information may be essential to accurately measuring the degree of the child's dependence on the taxpayer. The result of this accuracy includes benefits to the taxpayer, such as a credit against tax liabilities for amounts paid to adopt the child. 254 Weight also has to be given to the potential for evasion by the taxpayer, since the purpose of the surveillance system would be to reduce the compliance gap while reducing the opportunities for evasion.
In this balancing, some current provisions likely would be difficult to justify, like the medical expense deduction. First, the deduction is not necessary for the accurate measurement of a taxpayer's economic income. 255 Second, collection of medical information tends to involve information that taxpayers would not routinely share outside of particular social circles. Third, not all expenses are deductible. For example, breast augmentation may or may not be deductible. If its purpose is merely to improve appearance, it is not deductible. 256 However, if it is to ameliorate a deformity related to disease, then it is deductible. 257 The invasiveness of medical care surveillancesuch as determining the circumstances of breast augmentations-would rarely be outweighed by the tax benefits to the patient given how few patients would have tax benefits from the medical care payments. No medical expense is deductible by those taxpayers claiming the standard deduction, which is the majority of taxpayers. 258 Even among the minority who itemize, the deduction is only available when the total expenses exceed ten percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 259 The deduction is claimed on less than seven percent of returns. 260 A tax system that routinely collected all medical information on all taxpayers, but that provided medical-related tax benefits in such limited situations, would be hard to justify.
The exclusion of gain on the sale of the taxpayer's principal residence is a more generous tax benefit. 261 Like the medical expense deduction, this tax benefit is a deviation from the accurate measurement of income. 262 While the exclusion provides a significant tax benefit, 263 determining whether or not the sale qualifies could become quite invasive upon audit. For example, relevant information may include information related to multiple birth pregnancies, 264 illnesses, 265 loss of job or other change in job status 266 of the taxpayer or someone living with the taxpayer, 267 as well as where the taxpayer's family members live, 268 the taxpayer's banks, 269 and the identity and location of "religious organizations and recreational club with which the taxpayer is affiliated." 270 Routinely collecting this information would involve monitoring the health, employment profile, religious, and recreational habits of taxpayers. Would taxpayers prefer a system with that degree of monitoring, or would they prefer different tax consequences of the sale of a principal residence? Presuming that all relevant information is always collected invariably shifts our perspective. Given the low audit rate, the chances that a taxpayer would have to provide information on his or her banking, religious, and recreational habits is miniscule, even if the taxpayer claims the benefit of the exclusion of gain on the sale of the home. In practice, almost none of this information is ever disclosed to the IRS. The taxpayer does not even have to disclose to the IRS that he or she is claiming the exclusion. 271 However, if, under the Tax Surveillance System all of the information relevant under current law were actually collected, the balance of harms and benefits would shift, likely indicating that a number of provisions' privacy burdens would not be offset by tax benefits.
Researchers might contemplate ways to retain beneficial tax provisions while reducing their potential privacy burdens. It could be that a systematic review of the case law reveals that judges actually decide issues with reference to far fewer facts than the current Treasury Regulations cover. For example, it may be the case that, in disputes over whether a residence was a taxpayer's principle residence, judges do not consider the proximity of the residence to a religious institution. Similarly, it may be that, even though one judge considers reading habits relevant in determining whether or not a taxpayer had a profit motive or a hobby motive while pursuing a particular activity, 272 the best indication of a profit motive is actually the relative ratios of the activity's expenses to the income derived from the activity. 273 It may be that the information technology revolution itself could be leveraged in this research. Big Data analyses may reveal patterns of relevance we would never discern on our own.
In addition to privacy concerns, considerations of what new technology itself does best would be relevant to guiding the tax system into the technology revolution. It may be that incorporating artificial intelligence into tax administration means that tax law should be reformed to include more rules and fewer standards. Artificial intelligence is better suited for rule-making decisions. In some circumstances, it may be that moving towards rules and away from standards in order to allow greater room for computerizing legal processing is a sacrifice of fairness. In her review of legal automation projects, Danielle Citron concluded that "the emergence of automation threatens to" give rules "a huge, and often decisive, advantage on the basis of cost and convenience rather than the desirability of the substantive results they produce." 274 However, it may be that tax law in particular is better suited for a move towards more rules than some other bodies of law.
While a system of artificial intelligence may accommodate a great deal of complexity, the complexity ultimately should not exceed what a taxpayer can understand and apply without undue difficulty. This issue is best considered in light of the taxpayer's adversarial rights in the tax system. In the current tax system, the taxpayer is obligated to record relevant facts, interpret the relevant law, and apply it to the facts at hand in preparing the return. The taxpayer does not defend what she has done unless there is an audit and, ultimately, the defense is to a judge, not an IRS agent. For example, a taxpayer who takes a trip somewhat for business reasons and somewhat for personal reasons is obligated to rightly record the expenses of the trip but also to determine if the mixed-motive trip is primarily for business reasons or personal reasons. 275 So long as the taxpayer believes she has a pretty good argument (one with "substantial authority") 276 that the mixed-motive trip was primarily for business reasons, she is entitled to deduct the expenses accordingly. Not only is she entitled to give herself the benefit of the doubt, but she is entitled to do so even if she 273 The taxpayer's history of income or losses and occasional profits are factors to be considered in determining whether or not there was a requisite profit motive, but alongside, for example, the taxpayers' degree of personal pleasure in pursuing the activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)
. 274 Citron, supra note 167, at 1303. 275 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1960) (covering travel for business, mixed business, and personal reasons). 276 See supra note 33.
thinks a court likely would disagree. 277 But in a surveillancebased tax system, the system would collect the relevant dataperhaps how many minutes were spent in the client's office and how many minutes were spent in a friend's house-and tentatively conclude whether the trip was more business related or personal. The return would be drafted on that basis, though the taxpayer would have right to dispute it and appeal to the judiciary. Of course, for the taxpayer to dispute it, she would have to be informed as to how the conclusion was formed. The system would have to reveal how the decision was made and how the legal authorities were interpreted and applied in a way that the taxpayer could understand and respond. This is a matter of what has been called "technological due process," meaning that these sorts of automated decisions cannot be made within black boxes. 278 Ultimately, transparency must be found not only in the conclusions on individual taxpayer returns, but also in the design of the automated decision-making process. It would require a process with public notice, comments, and hearings. 279 Commenting on proposed Treasury Regulations requires tax expertise. But to comment on the process of coding the law and regulations would require not only tax expertise, but also some understanding of the computer coding process. Computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the law. 280 The combination of this limited expertise and limited vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when decision-making has been automated in other areas. 281 This makes the transparency of coding the project more important, in that independent tax experts need to be watching for such distortions. While tax experts may appreciate the complexities of the law and different understandings of how to resolve substantive legal uncertainties, they mostly cannot appreciate the complexities of the computer code and different ways of reflecting uncertainties in it. Part of the research agenda thus must be reconciling the complexities of the tax law and computer code, and doing so in a way that is transparent and subject to public review and comment.
In light of these issues, it seems that the tax law of 2040 should be fundamentally different than that of 2015 if revolutionary information technologies are to be integrated into its administration. What we must contemplate are not so much 277 Id. 278 Citron, supra note 167, at 1253, 1276-77, 1308. 279 Id. at 1289. 280 Id. at 1290. 281 Id. at 1256-58 (noting that mistakes of this type (and others) led the Colorado public benefits system to hundreds of thousands of incorrect benefits determinations).
